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Abstract: Sensemaking is the process of understanding 
situations of high complexity or uncertainty in order to 
make decisions. Individuals and teams that are good at 
sensemaking tend to collect and critically evaluate the 
available evidence, seek for consistency, and test 
assumptions underlying assessments. Furthermore, their 
experience allows them to have a high appreciation for 
how the context affects the problem. In this paper we will 
(1) present observations on successful and failing 
sensemaking in first responder teams, (2) discuss the 
development of sensemaking competency, and (3) present 
an approach for training the knowledge and skills that are 
critical for sensemaking. 
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1. Introduction 
A fire commander suddenly ordering the men to evacuate 
a burning building just before it collapses. The teacher 
superintending the school’s playground, knowing exactly 
when and where s/he has to be to prevent fights and 
bullying.  Or the General Practitioner who decides to 
conduct additional tests for one patient with symptoms 
resembling the common cold, whereas another patient 
displaying the same symptoms receives cold medicine and 
is sent home where s/he recovers.  Three different 
professionals, in different situations, making crucial 
decisions. What they have in common is that they were 
able to make the right decisions at the right time, because 
they correctly anticipated a grave turn of events. In other 
words: They knew how to make sense of the situation.  
 
Sensemaking is a process of explaining situations and 
predicting future events. It involves recognition and 
understanding of the underlying theoretical principles of 
situations rather than relying on surface features [1, 2, 3]. 
Furthermore, it requires the cognitive skills to monitor, 
critically reflect on, and adapt decision strategies to the 
irregularity of problem situations [4]. These competencies 
typically are not part of a training program for 
professional decision-making; they are mainly acquired as 
a result of experience in the field [5, 6, 7]. However, 
results from studies into general learning strategies, 
effects of instructional measures, and empirical 
evaluations of training concepts may provide guidelines 
and evidence based instructional concepts for designing 
adequate education and training programs in sense 
making. 
2. Making sense of ill-structured problems 
Sensemaking is a strategy that is applicable, or necessary 
for complex problem solving in non-routine situations, for 
which no simple analogies, automated, or rule-based 
solutions exist. Many of the crisis or disaster management 
problems that the first responders (police officers, 
firemen, military personnel) face are indeed complex and 
non-routine. Such task domains are often called ill-
structured [8, 9].  In the following sections, the 
characteristics of ill-structured task domains are described 
first, then an example of successful real-world 
sensemaking in such a domain is presented, and similarly 
information on a real-world disaster is discussed focusing 
on how a lack of sensemaking lead to the dramatic turn of 
events. In the last section, we conclude with discussing 
the characteristics of successful sensemaking, illustrated 
by the analyses of the real world examples of disaster and 
crisis management. 
2.1 Ill-structured domains 
In ill-structured problem domains such as crisis 
management, military command and control, or medical 
diagnosis, decision makers often have to attend to 
knowledge from different conceptual structures (schemas) 
simultaneously and interactively [8].  And across 
comparable cases the conceptual structures involved and 
the way they interact differ.  For example, in medical 
diagnosis, a patient’s characteristics (e.g., age, gender) 
and context (e.g., work, culture) may serve as a base line 
for judgments on the probability of some disease given a 
set of symptoms. Thus, information on population 
probabilities has to be combined with information on the 
predictive value of symptoms for diseases. However, 
different patients suffering from the same disease may 
report different symptoms. And the same symptom may 
be indicative of different diseases, depending on the type 
of patient.  A GP having to conduct a diagnosis can 
therefore be left with a very difficult decision problem 
[10], with far reaching consequences.   
 
2.2 Multidisciplinary teams in ill-structured domains 
A major mistake of operational multidisciplinary teams 
commonly made is a disregard of their own safety. It 
occurs regularly that they are so focused on managing 
problems of the teams on-scene, that they tend to forget to 
monitor their own environment and possible threats to 
their position. It was therefore remarkable that the 
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operational team of Flevoland, during the exercise 
‘Waterproef’ recognized that the flooding as a result of a 
dike break, would also become a threat to their own 
position. At the moment of the dike breaking, there were 4 
to 6 hours left before a major city would be flooded. The 
task of the operational team was to manage all activities 
and lower crisis response teams to defer the risks for the 
area and local population. Evacuations, preventing other 
accidents, managing back up systems, and restoring to the 
normal situation were some of their responsibilities. The 
team quickly started to assess the situation, for which they 
incorporated information from the coast guard, and other 
observations. During this process of situation assessment 
they identified that they themselves were part of the 
situation, and that made them realize that they had to 
assess the threat to their own headquarters. Once they 
made this assessment, and correctly concluded that their 
headquarters were in danger, they decided to relocate.   
However, sometimes situation assessments go wrong. A 
painful example of the kind is the disaster with the 
Liberian oil tanker Braer [11].  
On January 3rd 1993 The Braer, holding 84,700 liters of 
oil, is sailing from Norway to Quebec. Heavy winds and 
high waves make the tanker pitch and roll extensively and 
water flows over the deck. The crew notices that 4 steel 
pipes are adrift on deck; however, the captain decides not 
to have any men go on deck to inspect the situation 
because of the bad weather. Despite the weather and the 
detached pipes, the tanker maintains its’ course.    
The steel pipes cause damage to the protective valve of 
the air pipe of the diesel tank and as a consequence, 
seawater starts flowing into the diesel tank through this 
pipe. This pollutes the flow to the heater and as a 
consequence the heater extinguishes. This is detected by 
the crew but their attempts to turn the boiler back on are 
to no avail. At the same time, seawater is now flowing 
into the main diesel oil pipe, the main engine and the 
generator.  
After a while the crew detects seawater in the diesel oil 
and starts to clean the tank to remove the seawater. They 
do not realize that this seawater is flowing in through the 
damage valve from the deck. They work on separate 
symptoms – the boiler not turning on, the seawater in the 
tank, the steel pipes adrift on deck- but unfortunately an 
overall story of the situation is not build, let alone 
critically evaluated to come up with alternative 
explanations for all symptoms. The captain, not seeing the 
big picture of the situation but only acting on separate 
events, does not realize the seriousness of the problems 
and hence does not call for help or change his course.  
The situations then aggravates because the ship looses its 
main power and the engine malfunctions. The ship is now 
uncontrollable and very close to the Shetland Islands. It 
runs aground and both the ship and its load are lost, 
causing major ecological damage to the islands’ coastal 
area. 
2.3 Sense making 
Studies on naturalistic decision-making focus on how 
people make use of their expertise in real world judgment 
and decision making tasks  [5, 12]. On the basis of these 
studies, Klein, Moon, and Hoffman [13] have formulated 
the data/frame model of sensemaking. This model 
distinguishes two levels: The level of mental model 
formation which is backward looking and explanatory, 
and the mental simulation which is forward looking and 
anticipatory. Klein, Moon & Hoffman argue that decision 
makers always apply a frame, that is, some mental model 
based on experiences, when they observe and interpret the 
world around them. This frame serves the two levels of 
sensemaking: It guides both explanation of the situation 
and prediction of future events. Expertise is characterized 
by large amounts of relevant representations of 
prototypical experiences in memory as well as efficient 
structuring and chunking of this information to facilitate 
instant retrieval [14]. It allows experts to represent 
problems in terms of deep theoretical principles rather 
than surface features as novices commonly do [1, 2, 3]. In 
other words, experts have better mental models allowing 
them to identify and select relevant cues and patterns in a 
situation [15, 16, 17] and to perform more effective 
searches for further information [18, 19]. 
3. Training to make sense 
To develop the experience necessary to recognize a vast 
amount of situations, an individual needs to be confronted 
with many different situations and discover the relevant 
cues, rather than being told what aspects or cues are 
important [15]. Training should therefore be focused on 
presenting as many relevant problem situations as 
possible, and each situation should incorporate one or 
more relevant cues. But mere exposure to those situations 
is not enough for learning; there should be some process 
of deliberate or thoughtful processing of the context and 
cues to foster understanding and adequate skill 
acquisition. From the breadth of experience that is 
provided in such training, the learner may generalize 
abstract representations guiding judgment in novel 
situations [20, 21, 22].  
 
In the following sections, instructional measures and 
training concepts facilitating the process of generalization 
and formation of abstract representations are discussed: 
Scenario, Learning Activities and Feedback. 
3.1 Scenario 
Scenarios determine the context for and scheduling of 
learning tasks. A scenario consists of a description of the 
background of the task or problem the learner has to 
solve, a starting point and events specified in time or in 
relation to other events to trigger behaviour that 
contributes to skill acquisition. Scenario based training 
programs have the advantage that they can present real 
world problems to the learner, embedded within a realistic 
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context, and often with some level of interaction and time 
constraints that resemble real world situations.  
A specific approach to scenario-based training is the 
Tactical Decision Game (TDG; see e.g. [23, 24]). In a 
TDG realistic problems are presented to individual 
trainees or teams in the form of a tactical assignment. The 
games confront the trainees with complex and challenging 
decision-problems, require active participation of the 
trainees to attain a specific goal.  An adequate TDG has 
the following characteristics:  
• Dilemma The scenario needs to contain 
uncertainty to present a dilemma for the trainee 
such that there is not one correct solution but 
rather several solutions that may be more or less 
adequate.  
• Role-play Trainees are supposed to play a 
specific role in the game and make decisions in 
accordance with their role.  
• Limitations Information on the situation and time 
to solve the problem should be limited.  
• Discussion During and after the TDG trainees are 
prompted to discuss their own and their teams 
decision strategies. 
• Unexpected events During the game, unexpected 
or surprising events (from the viewpoint of the 
trainee) should be introduced to encourage 
discussion on the effects of several alternative 
solutions. 
 
TDGs provide trainees with the opportunity to study 
relevant tactical decision-problems and reflect on different 
solutions in a simplified task environment. This discovery 
oriented approach combined with the required discussion 
[25, 26, 27], and reflection [28] facilitate elaborate 
processing of the learning materials resulting in 
knowledge representations that allow trainees to abstract 
from the learning tasks to other tasks and situations.  
 
Important in the design of scenarios, for TDGs or some 
other form of scenario-based training, is to guarantee 
variability of practice [29]. Because trainees have the 
opportunity to compare between different variations, 
discover the invariants and variants of the situation, and 
relate those to the effects of their own performance, they 
are expected to develop more elaborate mental 
representations of the task. And consequently, even if 
variability is not part of the required post training 
performance, the variability during practice has been 
proven to enhance post training performance, compared to 
constant practice, on a number of different task types [30].   
Other scenario manipulations that may benefit post-
training performance are to introduce spacing of practice 
events [30] and contextual interference [31, 32]. Spacing 
refers to presenting the same practice events distributed 
among other practice events. Instead of repetitive 
presentations, or massed presentations, now the practice 
events are distributed in time and sequence.  Spacing is 
automatically introduced when contextual interference is 
enhanced by providing a practice schedule in which the 
different type of practice events are scheduled randomly 
instead of blocked.   
The spacing of practice events encourages trainees to 
rehearse between the events, and process the semantic, 
perceptual or contextual aspects of each presentation more 
extensively, thus leading to more elaborate 
representations and more retrieval cues stored in memory. 
In massed presentations, in contrast, the contextual 
aspects of the learning task are similar, hence less 
contextual aspects are stored, and the perceptual or 
semantic aspects of the learning task are primed by earlier 
task presentations, requiring less processing with each 
repetition.  The explanations for benefits of contextual 
interference, that is the interference as a result of the 
presentation of several task variations in sequence instead 
of blocked presentation of only one type of task, are 
similar. Explanations of the contextual interference effect 
involve trainees exhibiting more elaborate processing, not 
being able to rely on primed cues or solutions by 
preceding presentations, but instead having to reconstruct 
or retrieve solutions with each presentation. These 
explanations all assume that the random practice schedule 
requires more (elaborate) processing of the learning 
materials. Another explanation might be that the repetitive 
presentation of the same practice events lures trainees into 
believing that they already perform at an adequate level, 
thus they no longer put a lot of effort in processing the 
learning materials. Koriat & Bjork [33] refer to this 
phenomenon as developing an illusion of competence. 
Preventing an illusion of competence, e.g. by random 
schedules, motivates trainees to search for and reflect 
upon alternative task strategies and they thus gain a 
deeper level of understanding [34]. In this respect, Bjork  
[35] refers to the concept of desirable difficulty as 
something that should be strived for to prevent illusions of 
competence on the one hand, and frustration on the other. 
Bjork [35] mentions three instructional measures that may 
create desirable difficulty: (1) spacing (or interleaving) 
practice events, (2) increasing contextual variability, and 
(3) using tests frequently as learning events (see next 
section on learning activities). These measures often 
appear to slow the learner’s progress during instruction or 
training, but lead to better transfer test performance [35, 
36, 37] 
Another measure that may be expected to enhance 
desirable difficulty is scaffolded practice in the zone of 
proximal development [38]. For scenario design this 
means having a set of scenarios that present events that 
are categorized in different levels of complexity. Trainees 
may be practicing on scenarios that are somewhat too 
difficult for them, but in such scenarios support should be 
given to continue with the scenario. Trainees can benefit 
from such support by copying elements from an expert’s 
approach, solution, or representation of the task, into their 
own task schemas. Scaffolds may be in the form of 
augmented cues, when specific relevant cues in a situation 
or problem description are augmented [15] to attract the 
trainees’ attention and help the trainee distinguish 
between relevant and irrelevant information. Augmenting 
may be realized visually, for example, by increasing 
contrast values on a screen, or auditory, by presenting a 
warning signal. Another form of scaffolds can be worked-
out examples. These will be discussed in the section on 
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learning activities. 
 
3.2 Learning activities 
Learning activities encompass all tasks that trainees help 
to acquire knowledge and skill. These activities can be 
similar to the tasks to be, but they may also involve 
regulative, reflective or other activities that can contribute 
to learning.  
Sensemaking skill is highly dependent on the availability 
and richness of cognitive schemas, that is, networks of 
abstract mental concepts [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44]. These 
schemas facilitate recognition and categorization of 
problem situations, thus guiding identification of an 
appropriate response [45].  Decisions in such a 
recognition-based strategy are not made once all 
information has been gathered, but rather are constructed 
along the way [46]. Therefore, early decisions may be 
based on simplified information and more relevant 
information for this decision may become available later 
in the process. And in complex, ill structured task 
environments, simple analogies and prototypes do not 
always suffice [9]. Critically testing and evaluating one’s 
mental model are therefore considered paramount in the 
decision process, especially when high stakes are 
involved, when problems are dynamic and complex, or 
both.  
So, training can focus on practicing as many relevant 
problem situations as possible to develop elaborate 
schema’s necessary for sensemaking.  Secondly, training 
should incorporate the critical thinking strategies that may 
guide the sensemaking process. Freeman & Cohen [47] 
developed a program for training military officers critical 
thinking:  
1. Develop a story (i.e., form a mental model) of the 
situation. Incorporate history, intentions and capacities 
of all parties involved in your story to explain all your 
observations and predict future events. 
 
2. Test your story for conflicting and/or missing 
information. Try to explain all observations within one 
comprehensive story, even if these observations do not 
seem to be related to your story. Identify gaps in your 
story and make explicit assumptions to cover these 
gaps. 
 
3. Evaluate your story. There is the devil’s advocate 
that tells you—part of—your story is false. Try to 
come up with an alternative story that can also explain 
your observations. Which story is more plausible? 
 
4. Develop plans and contingencies for the weakest 
assumptions in your story. 
 
Such critical thinking strategies may prevent learners to 
fall prey to typical judgment biases, as in the Braer 
Disaster (see previous section), but they also enhance 
processes of generalization and abstraction of the content 
of the tasks, because critical thinking encompasses 
elements of reflection and self-explanation (see e.g., [25, 
28]). Several empirical studies have provided evidence 
that critical thinking training enhances post-training 
performance in complex judgment and decision-making 
skills.  
Analyses of historic events may serve as training 
materials for story building. In such analyses, the decision 
processes of professionals involved are often documented, 
and as a consequence, all essential elements of a 
comprehensive story can be easily identified.  If expert 
solutions are available, these can be used to develop 
worked-out examples: Problem situations for which (part 
of) an expert solution is presented to the trainee. Worked 
out examples are suitable when presenting problems to 
trainees for which they have not yet the schemas available 
to solve the problem. With an expert’s solution, they can 
build or elaborate their own mental representation of the 
problem. For more experienced trainees, partly worked 
out examples may serve as a prime to elicit the correct 
schema for the problem.  Several studies have shown that 
worked-out examples benefit learning in many problem-
solving tasks (e.g., [48]).  
 
Professional environments are characterized by increasing 
interdependency and complexity. As the complexity of the 
situation and environment increases, it becomes more 
unlikely that an individual will be able to manage the 
situation alone. That is, resources from many different 
areas of expertise may be needed [49, 50], and it may be 
effective to distribute the workload across several 
individuals [51]. Therefore, organizations are increasingly 
using teams to handle difficult, complex situations. 
Sensemaking, as a consequence, is often undertaken by 
teams, or at least by individuals working in teams. For 
such a team to come to a common understanding of a 
situation, it is important to collaborate and communicate 
effectively. Knowing each team members (information) 
needs is paramount for such quick and effective 
communication and collaboration. Having team members 
practice each other’s tasks, cross training, aims to provide 
them with insight into each other’s tasks [52].   
 
3.3 Feedback 
For adequate learning, feedback on the effects of one’s 
behaviour is indispensable. Within psychology and 
educational sciences a lot of research has been done on 
the efficiency and effectiveness of feedback for learning 
(see e.g. [53, 54]). Several types of feedback have been 
identified, such as positive and negative feedback, process 
feedback, outcome feedback, cognitive feedback, delayed 
feedback, peer feedback, to name a few. In general it has 
been concluded that positive feedback is more effective 
than negative [55] and delayed and infrequent [56] 
feedback generates better post training performance than 
frequent and immediate feedback.  
The benefits of a feedback strategy depend on task 
difficulty [57, 58, 59, 60]. Outcome feedback only 
provides information on the correctness of a decision; 
cognitive feedback concerns characteristics of the 
person’s cognitive processes as well as characteristics of 
the task [61].  In complex tasks, cognitive feedback often 
renders best performance, whereas in simple tasks, 
outcome feedback is better. Cognitive feedback may 
include information on the relationships between specific 
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task variables, or on the validity of certain variables for a 
solution [62]. In addition, there is a form of cognitive 
feedback that provides the learner with knowledge on his 
own learning process. And lastly, there is information on 
the correlation between the participants’ estimates on 
which task aspects they consider important and the actual 
importance of these task aspects. Cognitive feedback may 
include one or all three aspects mentioned above. For 
example, in a study by Gattie and Bisantz [63], 
investigating the effects of cognitive feedback on task 
performance in a dental diagnosis task, participants had to 
judge whether a dental condition was benign or malicious 
on the basis of a patient’s age, gender, tumour growth 
location, growth size, growth colour, and cancer risk. In 
the cognitive feedback conditions, participants received 
information on the weights they ascribed to those 
indicators, calculated continuously based on regression 
analysis of their decisions. A second cognitive feedback 
condition consisted of participants receiving information 
on the task: the relationships between cues and criterion, 
the validity of cues, and so forth. The last cognitive 
feedback condition involved information on the 
correlation between the participant’s decisions and the 
actual task properties. Both the information on decision 
strategies and task information improved participant’s 
performance. The first type of feedback was especially 
helpful for novice participants, which suggests that 
participants unfamiliar with the experimental task or 
specific domain may need to understand their own 
decision policies to facilitate learning [63].   
4. Empirical evaluations 
We have conducted several training studies that 
have shown positive results for critical thinking approach 
using TDG’s [24, 64]. These training studies were 
specifically designed to study the effects of our training 
manipulation. They were mini-training courses, conducted 
under controlled conditions. This is different from any 
normal training program in that it is more rigid (according 
to specific experimental protocols) and of short duration. 
A short training intervention may not provide the 
opportunity for trainees to really master critical thinking 
skills. In this section we report findings and observations 
of putting CT-training into practice. 
Recently, the Operational school of the Royal 
Netherlands Navy revised its training program for CIC 
(Command Information Centre) commanders. This 
reorganisation offered an opportunity to identify 
shortcomings of the existing programs, and to bring about 
improvements in training concepts, methods and materials 
for the new training program. It was concluded that 
theoretical lessons should be redesigned in such a fashion 
that: (a) students can develop a satisfactory repertoire of 
tactical patterns, and (b) there is sufficient opportunity to 
practice situation assessment and decision making skills. 
This should prepare students better for training exercises 
on the tactical simulator, and for the on-board exercises. 
To achieve the objectives, we decided to embed critical 
thinking into TDG exercises. Prior to the training 
sessions, instructors were instructed extensively on the 
concept and principles of critical thinking. Observation 
protocols and performance measures were designed to 
support instructors in their tasks. 
The majority of students were enthusiastic and 
motivated to co-operate. They appreciated the exercises as 
a suitable method for consolidating and applying their 
tactical knowledge, and for practising their skills in 
tactical assessment and decision-making. 
Although the majority of students were distinctly 
positive, there were also some individuals who failed to 
appreciate the purpose of the critical thinking concept. It 
appeared that some of these students lacked the domain 
knowledge required to conduct critical thinking as 
intended. For instance, they were unable to identify a 
critical assumption in their assessment, or were unable to 
judge the tactical relevance of ambiguous information. As 
a result, trainees applied the critical thinking method in an 
obligatory fashion, more like a checklist to be completed, 
rather than as an approach to reflect upon the quality of 
tactical assessments. During after-action-reviews they 
were reluctant to elaborate on alternative assessments, 
because they considered them to be “too unlikely." 
They felt that the required elaboration on the 
tactical issues presented in the TDGs helps students to 
develop tactical schemes, and that critical-thinking helps 
shaping the necessary skills for situation assessment or 
sensemaking. 
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
In this paper we have tried to describe sense making as a 
crucial skill for adequate problem solving in ill-structured 
domains. Our aim was to present a set of instructional 
interventions that may facilitate the acquisition of sense 
making skill. For this purpose, three parts of a training 
program were distinguished: Scenario, Learning Activities 
and Feedback. For each of these, we provided some 
information on approaches and interventions that may 
benefit post training performance in sense making. Below, 
we summarize the major recommendations.  
First, scenarios have to provide the opportunity to practice 
real problems, in which the dilemmas and probabilistic 
nature of ill structured domain is represented. Such 
scenarios should present a variety of learning tasks; 
facilitate discussion and evaluation of alternative 
strategies. If learning tasks are too difficult for novice 
trainees, scaffolds can be provided in the form of 
augmented cueing, or worked out examples. Secondly, the 
learning activities should encompass both the actual tasks, 
as well as self-regulative, or meta cognitive, activities to 
monitor and control the learning process. Critical thinking 
training is a good approach for this. In team learning, the 
learning activities should encompass cross training, that 
is, training in each other’s tasks to gain insight in the need 
for information and support of other team members, thus 
enhancing the coordination and communication within the 
team.  And lastly, feedback for learning the difficult task 
of sense making has to focus on providing insight into the 
task properties and the trainee’s own problem solving 
strategies, so called cognitive feedback.  
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